T HE STORY OF ADR in the US is one of 'co-optation' of what was to be a serious challenge to formalistic and legalistic approaches to legal and social problem solving and is now highly institutionalised by its more formal use in courts.
1 At the same time, use of private forms of dispute resolution in mediation, arbitration and newly hybridised forms of dispute resolution among disputants who can choose (and aff ord) to leave the formal justice system (in both large commercial matters and private family matters) has resulted in claims of increased privatisation of justice, with consequences for access to justice in diff erent areas of legal dispute resolution. These consequences include diffi culty of access to some forms of private dispute resolution for those who cannot aff ord them and claims that, with mass exits from the formal system by those who can aff ord to 'litigate' elsewhere, there is less interest in judicial service and reform. In addition, in recent years consumers and employees have have been largely unsuccessful in dispute resolution. The formal regulatory landscape in dispute resolution in the US now consists of at least the following legal sources:
The US Constitution (what process is 'due' in what (public) procedures and what governmental bodies are assigned what dispute resolution functions, eg separation of powers?) Federal legislation (eg Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 6 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 7 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 8 ) Federal rules of civil procedure (and criminal procedure for plea bargaining rules), including -Local rules for each federal district (94) -Circuit Court of Appeals rules and practices for mediation and other forms of settlement and ADR procedures (11 circuits and two specialty appeals bodies, for trade and patents 9 ) Common law jurisprudence and many precedents from US Supreme Court and appellate federal courts on many ADR issues (including mandatory arbitration (see below), confi dentiality, privileges, enforceability and 'good faith' participation requirements, among others) Administrative agency rules and practices in a variety of subject areas, including securities regulation, civil litigation, energy and environment, education, business and commerce, labour and military procurement (and including a federal governmental coordinating body for ADR eff orts in federal agencies 10 ) State legislation (50 states and several territories, eg Puerto Rico) State common and decisional law 11 Uniform Mediation Act/ Uniform Arbitration Act (eff orts to create common state law regulation in diff erent aspects of dispute resolution) Private contracts (specifying conditions and rules for dispute resolution, often enforced by courts, making common law rulings (with precedential eff ects) and including mass, trade association, institutional and organisational forms of 'internal' dispute resolution) Private decisional law (eg arbitration awards, some public (eg investment and labour) and most private (eg commercial arbitration) awards Private organisational rule systems (eg American Arbitration Association rules for arbitration, mediation; International Institute for Confl ict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), Association of Confl ict Resolution (ACR), including -Substantive -Procedural and -Ethical Rules At the level of procedural rules, little was said in 1938 about anything other than 6 28 USC § 471. 7 5 USC § 571. 8 28 USC § 651. 9 RJ Niemic, Mediation and Conference Programs in the Federal Appeals Courts (Washington, DC, Federal Judicial Center, 1997) . 10 Offi ce of Dispute Resolution, Department of Justice, Interagency Working Group on ADR, see <www. usdoj.gov>. 11 See, eg J Coben and P Thompson, 'Disputing Irony: a Systematic Look at Litigation about Mediation ' (2006) 11 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 43. formal trials, though innovations in information sharing and American-style discovery, class actions, simplicity of pleading rules, and a rule (Rule 16) about pre-trial settlement conferences with judges introduced some new processes for dispute resolution outside of a full-blown trial. Over the years, those rules have been amended many times to include complex rules about settlement off ers (Rule 68), the use of court appointed special masters to facilitate discovery and settlement (Rule 53), limits on discovery, and increased participation of both judges and court adjuncts to 'intervene' and promote settlement activity, 12 among other relevant rule amendments, the most important being the role that the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 83) allocates to each individual federal trial (district) court (94 of them in 50 states) to make its own 'local rules', which has turned out to be a major source for ADR regulation in federal courts. 13 Over the years, most states have conformed their formal procedural rules to look much like the federal rules, though with respect to 'ADR' some states took the lead in promoting (and regulating) the use of court-adjunct processes to encourage settlement (eg Massachusetts, Florida, Ohio, New York, Texas and California).
14 After the procedural 'revolution' in 1938, American formal law turned most of its attention to creating new substantive rights, through the activism of a variety of social and legal movements, civil (and now human) rights, consumer rights, women's rights, environmental protection, gay rights and anti-poverty activism, using both legislation and litigation to create, establish and litigate about these new legal rights and entitlements. At the same time, the procedural innovation of class actions led to many more law suits to effi ciently claim on behalf of discriminated individuals and groups, securities and consumer frauds, mass tort victims and other aggregated claims. All of this led to an expansive increase in litigation and to the somewhat contested claim that the US was the most litigious nation in the world. 15 The movement for more 'informal' justice in the US in the late 1970s and early 1980s 16 drew its inspirations from a variety of sources, including the desire for qualitatively better options and solutions for dispute resolution problem solving in substance, 17 and more party participation and empowerment in procedure and process, as part of larger political movements seeking democratic participation in the polity and the legal system. The impetus for much procedural reform, however, came from courts and judicial offi cials, including then Chief Justice Warren Burger, who sought to decrease court dockets and case processing time, reduce litigation cost and complexity, and for the cynics among us, move cases away from federal courts to other fora, including state courts, small claims venues, and other processes outside of the courts, tied together in the nomenclature of 'alternative' dispute resolution. Thus, from the beginning, at least two diff erent motivations for alternative or less formal processes were present-the 'quantitative-effi ciency' concerns to make justice more accessible, cheaper, faster and effi cient, and the more 'qualitative-party empowering' ideas that, with greater and more direct party participation, and identifi cation of underlying needs and interests, parties might identify more tailored solutions to their problems that would be less brittle and binary than the win/lose outcomes of formal courts, with 'limited remedial imaginations '. 18 In recent years, the progress of dispute resolution variations has been labeled, by this author, as 'process pluralism ', 19 and by others as 'appropriate' (not alternative) dispute resolution, connoting recognition that not all matters should be subjected to the same treatment-'one size of legal process does not fi t all'. Diff erent kinds and numbers of parties, issues, structures of disputes and legal matters might dictate different formats of dispute processing.
20 This is a serious questioning of the American procedural ideal of 'transsubstantive' procedure, 21 and such claims invoke both notions of 'technocratic' assignment of cases to effi cient or appropriate fora, 22 as well as more deeply jurisprudential concerns about whether diff erent processes are necessary to ensure diff erent kinds of justice in diff erent situations. Must 'all cases' be treated 'alike' or, if 'like cases' are to be treated 'alike', how do we know which cases are 'like enough' each other to be treated with the same process and procedure?
Debates about 'the vanishing trial' 23 and the loss of formal procedures, as fewer and fewer cases make it all the way to full adjudication in the US (only about 2 per cent of cases fi led in a wide variety of courts, both federal and state, general and specialised, now go on to full trial), have raged among scholars, judges and lawyers, as there is now concern, on the part of some, that not enough cases are available to generate the precedents we need in a common law, stare decisis legal regime to transparently produce reasoned rules and principles for the governance of our society. 24 As I argued some years ago, this is a question of 'Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?'
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-the parties seeking dispute resolution or the larger society that needs transparent and certain kinds of (adversarial?) processes to produce law and justice for the 'many' out of the disputes of the 'few'.
The relationship of process to assessments of justice is a serious jurisprudential question, considered by many procedural theorists. A separate fi eld of 'procedural justice' or 'the social psychology of justice' has claimed for decades, through empirical study, that users of dispute resolution process assess the 'justice' and 'fairness' of processes independently from the outcomes parties achieve.
26 From the American side, I have long claimed that Lon Fuller is our 'jurisprudent of process ', 27 for in a series of articles Fuller has argued that each diff erent process, whether adjudication, arbitration, mediation, legislation or regulation (and other processes, such as voting) has its own 'integrity'-that is, its own norms, ethics and types of outcomes produced, each requiring its own philosophical justifi cation, as well as the possibility of its own set of 'rules'.
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In the modern-day experience of so many varied processes used for dispute resolution (reviewed below), I often ask if Lon Fuller would approve of the great hybridisation of process that has occurred in recent decades, with such new forms as mediation and arbitration combined to form med-arb or arb-med 29 (in labour, family, commercial disputes), 'early neutral evaluation' 30 or 'settlement conferences', a process comprising both judges and lawyers, giving evaluative feedback to counsel and parties in pre-trial settings, 31 'summary jury trials' 32 (jury advisory opinions in public courts for settlement purposes), 'mini-trials' 33 (private hybrid processes using witness testimony, argument, negotiation, mediation and sometimes arbitration) and 'private judging ', 34 where private parties hire judges to adjudicate matters in secrecy, with full appellate processes and protection of the courts (as is authorised by state constitutions and statutes, such as in California)-and now even private juries 35 are hired to resolve disputes outside of the courts, so there is independent lay fact-fi nding, but no public record of the outcome or deliberations. What would Lon Fuller, and what should we, scholars and practitioners of procedural law, make of all these various processes? How do we know if these processes are fair, just and appropriate for either the parties themselves or the larger system of legal dispute resolution?
In this chapter I will address these questions by suggesting that, in the US, we now have more than 'formal' or 'informal' processes-we have many 'semi-formal' (hybrids or mixtures of processes), and the question is how shall we evaluate the effi cacy, effi ciency and legitimacy of so many diff erent kinds of process. In the US, we have 26 EA Lind and T Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York, Plenum Press, 1988) (both civil and criminal) , as well as countless specialised tribunals with their own procedural rules, such as in bankruptcy, labour, family law, securities, technology, trade, patent and trademark, and taxes.
We also have many informal fora for dispute resolution, including private uses of mediation, arbitration and related processes, religious courts and mediation agencies, specialised business and industry panels of dispute resolution (eg banking, insurance, franchise, construction, technology, sports and energy), using both mediation and arbitration techniques, 36 community and neighbourhood dispute resolution processes, 37 online consumer forms of dispute resolution, 38 internal organisational forms of dispute resolution (ombuds or 'IDR' (internal dispute resolution 39 ), including grievance processes in large corporations, universities, trade unions, government agencies and non-governmental institutions 40 ), as well as dispute resolution fora even in illegitimate enterprises-gangs 41 and organised crime. We now also have a more hybrid set of processes which can be called 'semiformal' forms of dispute resolution, which utilise both private and public processes with increasingly structured and formal aspects of process, even if there is little to no recourse to more formal adjudication or appellate review. These include the 'ADR' programmes 'annexed' to courts, with a great deal of federal and state variations in rules, and access to courts after use, mandatory arbitration clauses found in many consumer and business contracts, which obligate parties to use structured out of court arbitration tribunals, some with very detailed procedural rules, but little to no appeal to courts (under the Federal Arbitration Act's limited grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award 42 ), as well as the elaborate structure of international commercial arbitration which is now quite 'formal' in its conduct, if still mostly unattached to formal courts. 43 Press, 1996) . But see A Stone Sweet, 'Arbitration and Judicialization'(2011) 1(9) Onati Socio-Legal Series 1, who argues that some forms of international arbitration (state-investor arbitration) are becoming increasingly judicialised by explicitly publishing rulings, giving reasons in opinions and decisions, which include common legal doctrines like proportionality and balancing, allowing amicus curiae briefs, treating past decisions as precedential and arguing for appellate processes. Some scholars (I am among them, see C Menkel-Meadow, 'Are Cross-Cultural Ethics Standards Possible or Desirable in International Arbitration?' in P Gauch, F Werro, P Pichonnaz (eds), Melangés en l'honneur de Pierre Tercier (Geneva, Schulthess, 2008) ) think that even international commercial arbitration, a creature of private contract, is in fact, dependent on the state-national courts for enforcement and recognition of awards, pursuant to a public international law treaty (the New York Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958) and that international commercial arbitration is, in fact, creating a common law of modern lex mercatoria, T Carbonneau, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law Merchant, (Huntington, NY, Juris Net, 1997). impossible to imagine in the US with this great variety of types of process and locations of process in both public and private, and now 'hybrid' spheres.
Years ago, in an eff ort such as the present one, I imagined that a 'core' set of ethical guidelines for conducting mediation could be designed, 44 and I spent fi ve years chairing a commission to write uniform ethical rules for lawyers serving as third-party neutrals (arbitrators and mediators) in alternative processes 45 (a subject that had never been regulated by American ethical and professional responsibility rules for lawyers in general).
46 Though many private organisations have now followed with rules of ethics (confi dentiality, confl icts of interest, etc) for third parties and advocates in ADR proceedings, there are in fact not that many 'core' principles upon which everyone can agree. Even within the US, confl icts of interest, ex parte communications with arbitrators, practice with non-legal professionals, methods of fee payment, 47 and a host of other issues remain variable and contested.
As I have written before, when ADR is taken to multi-national or international contexts, the issues become even more complicated, as diff erent systems impose different rules with respect to such issues as whether witnesses may be prepared before testimony (malpractice if not done in the US, unethical in England and Germany), discovery, cross-examination, written versus oral testimony, confl icts of interest 48 and many other procedural diff erences. The European Directive on Mediation (2008/58/ EC) has an ethics code appended to it (European Code of Conduct for Mediators 49 ), but I predict that these principles will have many diffi cult legal and social cultural issues in application, and they already fail to deal with all the issues that might arise in a multi-national mediation setting.
For purposes of this chapter, I use the term 'semi-formal' from American etiquette dressing requirements ('smart casual' is the British equivalent) to connote the attempt to locate dispute processes half way between formal tuxedos or 'black tie' and evening gowns of the bygone days of formal gatherings (and formal regulation), and the totally informal or casual dress more common in today's variety of professional, family and 46 There is now some minimal regulation in the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct which recognises that lawyers may serve in these capacities, MRPC Rule 2.2, but 'tribunals' to which a lawyer owes a duty of candor includes arbitration, but excludes mediation (Rule 1.1 defi nition (o)), which has been assimilated to include a slightly diff erent set of ethics for negotiation found in Model Rule 4.2 (allowing some forms of 'puffi ng' (exaggeration), no duty to disclose true 'opinions' or one's real principal). 47 Whether ADR should permit 'contingent fees' (or a percentage of the settlement amount for the mediator or award for the arbitrator), as is permitted in American litigation, remains a hotly contested subject. Some private mediators and arbitrators also charge very large (and unregulated) daily or hourly fees as well, rising to as much as tens of thousands of dollars a day or many thousands of dollars an hour in high stakes matters. For lawyers in more traditional practice, the ethics rules now require at least some written disclosures of 'reasonable' fees, and in some settings (eg class actions, bankruptcy, and statutory fee cases) there is some judicial review of fees in some matters.
48 C Rogers, Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) . 49 The new International Mediation Institute (based in the The Hague) has also been promulgating suggested standards and rules for mediators, both for competence and ethics, and for cultural competency as well, see <www.IMImediation.org>. entertainment gatherings. To request 'semi-formal' dress is to ask the gentlemen to wear ties and jackets, if not tuxedos, and to hope that the women will wear, if not dresses and skirts, than at least 'fancy pants'. The idea is to preserve some notion of order, elegance, solemnity and seriousness to the social event. Thus, 'semi-formal' uses of mediation and arbitration in the courts suggest (sometimes falsely) that someone is looking over or supervising the choice of mediators or arbitrators and ensuring their competence and ethics, and, in some cases, permitting a further appeal to the blackrobed (and formal) adjudicator. What level of regulation is appropriate for formal, informal and now 'semi-formal' dispute resolution remains, for me, somewhat problematic, as I report below on a wide variety of regulatory diff erences in both federal and state courts in the US, as well as some private settings in which dispute resolution occurs. More problematic is the assumption that 'regulation' will be eff ective and can guarantee some measure of both quality of process and access to process in such a variegated environment.
For example, the elaborate rules of the American Arbitration Association, if not full-on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, still provide for some discovery and mandatory information exchange, that old American practice of document production and factual inquiries of the other side, in person (depositions) and through detailed (and costly) document and now computer searches, preliminary relief, and in some cases the same relief (punitive damages) as courts would provide in the US. Though virtually all of this occurs without full public transparency or appellate review, at least (in theory) everyone knows the rules they have selected (usually through contract or selection of a particular arbitral administering institution). Recently in the US, many eff orts to challenge the true 'voluntariness' of these now 'mandatory' clauses to arbitrate contract, consumer, business and employment disputes have failed, as the formal courts, including the US Supreme Court, have sustained contracts which require certain forms of dispute resolution (usually arbitration), even where consumers and employees do not really know or understand what they are signing.
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Totally casual or informal forms of dispute resolution are now called 'litigationlite' (arbitration) or 'mediation-heavy' (evaluative mediation where third party neutrals decide or strongly suggest solutions to parties, rather than simply facilitating party negotiation 51 ), and occur without formal clarity about the procedural rules applied or what can happen if the process fails. The question here is whether 'semi-formal' processes can legitimately operate in a space between the transparency and presumed consistency of formal justice, and the confi dentiality, fl exibility and self-determination of informal processes. Should we be subjecting diff erent kinds of process to diff erent 50 kinds of evaluative criteria and rules or should all process be judged by the same criteria?
This increasing complexifi cation, segmentation and diff erentiation of process, which was intended to express and be justifi ed by such important justice values as party choice, consent, self-determination and party-tailored solutions to problems, now potentially threatens other justice notions of consistency, transparency, true consent and knowledge, as well as equity, equal treatment, clarity, and socially 'uniform' and just solutions.
By describing and reviewing some of the more interesting current developments in modern American process pluralism here, I hope to expose the diffi culties, paradoxes and contradictions of processes that have diff erent goals and purposes (especially if parties have diff erent goals and purposes within the same dispute), especially when 'semi-formal' is neither formal nor informal. Consider, as reviewed below, the paradox of enforcing private arbitral awards in public courts, the absence of clear enforcement rules for private mediation, the confl icts of private religious 'courts' with public values expressed in formal state courts, 52 the role confl ation of judges who mediate or manage settlement conferences rather than adjudicate, and the absence of records by which to judge any of this when parties choose to take their informal or semi-formal dispute resolution processes to entirely private settings. To what extent do we need 'formalism' in the form of public or transparent, uniform rules of process and procedure to judge the legitimacy, fairness or justice of any particular dispute resolution process? To what extent should diff erent processes be permitted to have diff erent forms of legitimacy or justifi cation? Are values of 'party control' and 'consent' contradictory to the needs of the state to provide 'public justice' and both procedural and substantive 'transparency'? Is 'process pluralism' itself a 'just' good?
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 'FORMAL' JUSTICE
Conceptions of formal justice in modern American jurisprudence include, in a trial or formal hearing setting, transparency or publicity of proceedings, reasoned legal arguments based on legal precedent and 'proven' facts, including witness examination and testimony, and discovery of facts, documents and information, even from adverse parties and sources, public offi cials (whether elected or appointed in both state and federal variations) as judges who advise fact fi nders (juries) about the law or engage in fact-fi nding themselves, as well as make legal rulings, write formal, reasoned opinions that have precedential or stare decisis impact on other, like, cases, and most importantly, are governed by formal rules (Federal (or state) Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure), and are subject to appellate and other review procedures. tion or 'formal justice' is warranted when there is a need for reasoned argument to decide disputes, not only for the immediate disputants, but also to elucidate rules for the larger society, especially when rights (and especially competing rights) are at issue. Adjudication requires the decision of 'authoritative' and 'neutral' decision makers who explain their reasons (assumed to be agreed to or binding on the disputants and the larger society in which they are embedded), which are derived from what we now commonly call 'the rule of law', or properly enacted law (legal positivism) or common law interpretive law.
The third party neutral judge or 'universal third' (as historian Martin Shapiro describes the role) is expected to be detached from the parties and the issues, and to 'rule' on the basis of agreed to substantive and procedural rules. This assumes the foundational principle of 'consent' to the juridical form and 'jurisdiction' (power to speak) of the tribunal. Many Anglo-American writers on formal justice also assume a particular kind of process-adversary argument, with assumptions that 'truth', as well as justice, will be produced by hearty and contested, if 'policed', production of evidence, and arguments from 'both' (assuming two) sides. 54 The neutrality and disinterestedness of the 'decider' or 'arbiter' in formal justice is so important to many jurisprudes of formal process that any departure from the distinctive adjudicative role (such as to 'manage' or mediate cases) is regarded as sullying the basic process.
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In summary, conceptions of the core aspects of formal justice include:
Formal and clear rules of procedures, known to or consented to by the parties, including allocation of tasks of production of proof and evidence rules Transparency/publicity of hearing Neutrality and disinterestedness of deciders of both fact (sometimes juries) and law (judges) Access to information from all parties (under oaths of truth telling), with limited confi dentiality or other policy protections Rights or 'rule of law' based outcomes and decisions With appropriate and authorised legal remedies ordered by Public offi cials (judges) or their delegates (juries), with Public and reasoned decisions explaining outcomes and legal basis of outcomes for Clarifi cation of rules and basis of decision for the parties, and guidance for others in similar situations Possibility of review of decisions for error or other faulty process or substantive reasons All of these elements defi ne various aspects of the content of the American (and Anglo) conception of 'due process'. Unfortunately (for formal justice and the parties), even some of the strongest proponents of the need for 'adjudication' in some circumstances (eg when 'rights' are necessary to make 'right') acknowledge that some situations call for diff erent elements of dispute resolution or decision making both at the individual (eg family or workplace) and societal (the polity) level. Lon Fuller acknowledged that some relationships (family, workplace, repeat commercial customers) and some matters (the 'polycentric' dispute with many intersecting and mutually aff ecting issues) were better handled in other forms of resolution (mediation with trades, in some settings, votes of aggregate masses in democratic legislatures, arbitration when privacy, speed and consistency are desired). Rights sometimes confl ict with each other, without a clear or single allocation to 'right' (eg consider rights of privacy and public rights to know; parental 'rights' in custody matters, and various confl icts in religious and secular rights in modern constitutional orders). And even some important public matters (eg domestic violence, child abuse, drug use) might be better handled with less public adjudication (and shame) and more private and caring solutions (as in modern problem-solving courts or private restorative justice settings). Categories of case types and proper process treatments do not always neatly converge.
Thus, for Lon Fuller, 'other' processes are themselves morally, politically, socially and legally legitimated by what parties might want or need, or the situation requires. Fuller's (and my own 56 ) claims for other processes are based on the 'integrity of process diff erences' themselves, not just the need for faster, cheaper or more effi cient forms of traditional adjudication. Parties might want to preserve relationships or communities or workplaces without brittle, rigid or binary decisions (which could lead to desires for revenge or retribution in repeat play settings). Parties might want to 'share' (eg children in divorce) or preserve, rather than divide, resources. Rules of law might give both or 'all' sides to a particular dispute similar or non-dispositive claims of right. Coordinated, rather than competitive, action could lead to creative new outcomes and solutions to new or unlegislated for problems or issues.
57 Some communities might prefer to resolve their disputes or solve their problems within their own community norms.
III. INFORMAL JUSTICE IN THE US
Although there is a long history of informal justice in the US, with religious, local community and business groups negotiating, mediating or arbitrating their own disputes since the early colonial period and continuing to the present, 59 modern informal dispute resolution in the US is derived from several diff erent substantive fi elds (labour, 60 ) and a social movement (party empowerment, consumer 65 and civil rights accountability and more tailored solutions to social and legal problems) of the 1970s and 1980s, which together produced a turn to private negotiation, mediation, 66 community consensus building, 67 and commercial arbitration processes.
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Modern American dispute resolution has a strong intellectual grounding 69 in decision sciences, 70 game theory, 71 international relations, economics, social and cognitive psychology, 72 anthropology, 73 sociology 74 and political science, as claims for 'better' solutions to legal and social problems were articulated with reference to 'interest and needs'-based negotiations, 75 pie-expanding, not dividing, resource allocation, 76 effi cient information sharing and processing, 77 and a move away from purely 'competitive' processes to collaborative and coordinated decision making. 78 In the 1970s and 1980s, theorists of better problem solving, combined with judicial and political activists, called attention to many processes 'alternative' to court-and formal-based dispute resolution, including dyadic and multi-party negotiation, mediation, arbitration and hybrid processes like community consensus building, ombuds within organisations and victim-off ender mediation in criminal matters. 79 What was formerly under the radar screen (negotiation as the most common form of dispute resolution, through settlements prior to, during or even after trial) became the subject of formal instruction in law schools, empirical and social science study, 80 and policy making by courts. 81 Judges like Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wanted to reduce case loads in the courts, touted the advantages of more responsive, private forms of dispute resolution in out of court negotiation, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution. The US Congress appropriated money for 'neighborhood justice centers' which were to deal with 'minor disputes', using both lawyers and non-lawyer mediators for such matters as neighbourhood disputes, minor (misdemeanour) crimes, small commercial disputes, landlord-tenant disputes and a variety of other matters. Restorative justice, in the form of victim-off ender mediation, 'healing' and 'sentencing circles', were derived from American (and Canadian and Australian) indigenous ('Indian') groups to provide community-based alternatives to criminal punishment, especially, but not exclusively, used for juvenile off enders. Such eff orts at community-based restorative justice are now used even in felony and serious crimes in a few pioneering states (eg Wisconsin). 82 National level processes, in other countries, are now used for restorative justice in the form of truth and reconciliation commissions, supplemental to or substitutionary for formal adjudication in post-confl ict, post-civil war and acknowledgement of national wrongs (eg Canada Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Process 83 ), but so far have been rejected with respect to the American experience of slavery, destruction of indigenous communities and other national or government supported harms.
Specialised areas of law, like family law and labour law, 84 had long used informal processes, like negotiation and mediation, for dispute resolution, but the practices of both family and labour mediation began to be applied and opened out to a greater variety of legal (class actions, torts and contracts claims), political (resource allocation, environmental disputes, local government disputes) and social disputes (community policing, racial tensions, ethnic tensions, educational institutions). Lawyers and law students, as well as other professionals, began to seek training in mediation and the 'healing arts', as well as continuing study of more conventional litigation skills. To date, however, there is virtually no offi cial licensing or credentialing for mediators or other dispute resolution professionals.
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Perhaps most interestingly, various forms of 'informal' dispute resolution have been used to great eff ect in 'extra-, non-or il-' legal enterprises. The fi lm The Godfather dramatised the use of 'elder' mediation in resolving disputes within the 'cosa nostra' (Mafi a) and, more recently, sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh gained access to both internal gang mediation and informal 'community policing' mediation of gang-related disputes in Chicago, within gangs and in relations that gang members have with the larger community.
86 I have come to call this form of informal dispute resolution A2 (alternative alternative) Dispute Resolution, having learned some years ago about the eff ectiveness of gang leaders in mediating disputes in the favellas of Rio de Janeiro. 90 This social movement encouraged individuals and communities to seek resolution of social, political, economic and even legal problems outside of the courts, using community mediation, consensus building, group organising and strategies that allowed more than two parties to seek resolution of problems by negotiated and 'consensual', not court-commanded, solutions. In the private corporate sector, hundreds of Fortune 500 companies and their large law fi rms signed the 'Center for Public Resources Pledge' to pursue out of court dispute resolution procedures with each other before continuing or initiating litigation. Over time, these 'informal' processes were criticised for 'privatising' justice that many thought should remain in the public and formal sector 91 for transparency of process, generation of public precedential rulings and equalisation of unequal power or economic endowments. Others, including this author, continued to maintain that some aspects of 'informal' dispute resolution (absence of some formal rules, confidentiality, 'trading of preferences', creation of new party-specifi c norms and tailored solutions to problems) produced better 'justice' for some, if not all, disputants. Thus, core claims of value for 'informal' justice included:
Direct party empowerment and participation in case 'presentation' and resolution Self-determination Consent Tailored solutions, based on party needs and interests, not necessarily 'rights' and claims of law (utilising tailored individual, religious, ethical or communitarian principles for resolution, eg 'joint custody' in divorce and children's custody) Non-monetised outcomes and solutions (apologies, trades, in-kind, other forms of 'relief') Future, not just past, oriented problem solving, without need necessarily of fact fi nding or assessment of blame Confi dentiality, producing the opportunity for changed 'positions', trades and non-precedential accommodations or solutions, as well as privacy protection for disputants of all kinds, individuals and organisations Inclusion of more than two litigant 'parties in interest ' (multi- Potentially faster and cheaper dispute resolution ('effi ciency') Greater legitimacy of and compliance with party-chosen outcomes
The relative success and power of some forms of informal processes led, beginning in the 1980s, to adaptations and transformations of private informal processes like negotiation, mediation and arbitration, and their hybrids, to use in more public settingsthus courts began to 'annex' mediation and arbitration processes (and in some cases to make them mandatory), business began to formalise, in contracts, uses of mandatory arbitration, and a variety of organisations began to 'internalise' and mandate the use of informal grievance processes as a condition precedent of any recourse to public and formal litigation processes. At the same time, even formal public court processes began to use and transform themselves into more 'informal' processes such as 'problem-solving courts' in drug, youth, family, mental health and vice courts, 94 the pre-trial settlement conference morphed into a mediation session, 95 and multi-party participatory consensus building fora turned into public 'negotiated rule-making' proceedings in administrative and regulatory law and proceedings, 96 all of which eventually received legal recognition in formal rules and legislative authorisations.
97 Uses of informal negotiation and dispute resolution processes (hybrids of mediation and arbitration) were increasingly used to settle mass class actions in tort, consumer law, securities, employment and other matters, 98 and even single dramatic mass disasters like the deaths arising out of the 11 September 2001 terror attack on New York were dealt with by use of informal settlement processes with public funds and public recognition. The 'informal' has become 'semi-formal'.
IV. 'SEMI-FORMAL' JUSTICE IN THE US
With the expansion and acceptance of ideas of informal consensual problem solving and dispute resolution in the early 1990s, all branches of the US government responded. Courts began, at both federal and state levels, to off er, at fi rst voluntary, then later mandatory, programmes of court-annexed mediation and arbitration processes, and 92 See, eg L Fuller, 'Mediation: Its Form and Its Functions' (1971) later included such processes as 'early neutral evaluation' (a process in which counsel in a case meet with a volunteer or paid lawyer to review claims, schedule discovery and information exchange, pursue settlement and get an informal 'evaluation' of the merits of the case). A few innovative judges, like Thomas Lambros in Ohio and Jack Weinstein in New York, began to adapt private settlement techniques for public cases. Lambros originated the 'summary jury trial'm in which lawyers (and witnesses) presented shortened versions of their cases (usually in no more than one day) to those in the jury venire for an 'advisory opinion' by the jurors for use in further case settlement negotiations. This practice was criticised as confl ating the public function of the jury, 100 whose members came to court expecting to fi nd facts in a litigated case, and instead were used to assist private negotiation discussions. Summary jury trials were often used in high-value fact disputes (asbestos and other mass claims) in order to set baseline lay fact evaluations of the quality of formal proof and evidence. When some judges ordered the use of this process in individual cases (eg civil rights) against the will of the parties, litigants began to appeal to higher courts and the process has declined in usage in recent years. Legal questions also were raised about whether there could be public access to these proceedings, which were a hybrid of private negotiations, but conducted in a public courtroom.
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Federal District Judge Jack Weinstein, among others, used the formal Civil Procedure Rule permitting the use of Special Masters (Fed R Civ Proc 53) to organise discovery and case evaluation in complex cases (also asbestos and other mass claims and class actions, as in the famous Agent Orange case 102 ) and then permitted special masters (such as the now similarly famous Ken Feinberg, special master of the 9/11 Fund) to act as mediators in settling such cases, with some controversial imprimatur of the judicial offi ce.
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The 1980s and 1990s saw modifi cation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the use of some of these settlement practices (Rule 16 was amended to make negotiation of settlement an explicit part of the pre-trial conference and many federal courts used the local rule power of Fed R Civ Proc 83 to craft local rules for the use of ADR in 'court annexed' programmes). 104 The federal courts in New York City, San Francisco, Boston and Washington, DC were among the early pioneers of complex menus of ADR choices and requirements to use some form of ADR.
105 Now, by virtue of federal legislation, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (requiring all federal courts to implement some cost and delay ameliorative programmes), the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (allowing experimentation with mandatory arbitration in federal courts), the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 (authorising the use of negotiated rulemaking processes in administrative regulation) and, fi nally, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (requiring all federal courts to implement some programme of ADR, while allowing each district court to decide what is best for its region), virtually every federal court in the US has some form of ADR. These courts report on the usage rates of mediation, arbitration, and settlement programmes in a non-uniform manner. Statistical reports available from many of the most populous states (including New York, California, Texas and Michigan; see below) demonstrate high usage of a variety of non-trial forms of dispute resolution, within the formal court, with 'settlement rates' ranging from 30 per cent to over 70 per cent in some courts. Virtually all of the federal courts of appeals now have formal mediation programmes, most with full-time staff s, a few relying on volunteer mediators 106 (this author has been a mediator in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals and has also trained the staff and volunteer mediators, as well as judges, in many federal courts).
Even the executive branch of the US government strongly encouraged use of ADR. During President Clinton's presidential term, Attorney General Janet Reno required mediation training of herself and her senior staff (I performed this training), authorised an 'ADR czar' position in the Justice Department, currently the Program of Dispute Resolution in the Justice Department, allocated funds for the settlement of cases involving the federal government, and changed policies having to do with federal government participation in arbitration and mediation programmes. In addition, an Interagency ADR Working Group representing all the major federal agencies began to meet regularly to discuss dispute resolution programmes throughout the federal government. Many agencies now provide for 'collateral duty' in which employees in one agency act as mediators or dispute resolution consultants to other agencies in the government (thus providing some neutrality and lack of confl ict of interest in internal agency matters). An awards programme honoured such branches of the government as the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy for instituting non-litigation dispute resolution processes in procurement contracts, and later even in dispute resolution issues in war zones. 107 In addition, many federal agencies now have internal dispute resolution programmes, including ombuds to resolve internal confl icts 108 (employment, policy), as well as to deal with disputes with clients or customers of particular agencies (eg Environmental Protection Agency, Securities and Exchange Commission, National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy).
These uses of 'informal' dispute processes within the formal government are one form of 'semi-formal' dispute resolution, sometimes, but not always, authorised by regulation, at other times just by agreed-to practices or recommendations. Practices can change with the change of political administration. To what extent should formal rules of procedure, requirements of transparency, publicity, rule of law, appeals from decisions or mediation or negotiated agreements be applied to such processes? To what extent are such processes really 'consensual'? And if, instead, they are 'mandated', what redress is there to formal courts? Finally, questions have been raised about whether these processes really do live up to their promises and intended goals.
In the middle of the 1990s, the federal government supported a major $5 million research programme (fi elded by the RAND Corp) to determine if ADR in the courts 106 really did 'reduce cost and delay'. The results were decidedly mixed and controversial. RAND found that there was little actual reduction in cost and delay in courts that used mediation, arbitration or early neutral evaluation processes, 109 but the RAND study itself was criticised for studying a moving target. Many of the courts in the study were changing their policies to conform to the legislation discussed above as the study was ongoing. Courts in the federal system that were 'matched' because of similar caseloads for comparison and 'control' purposes were, in fact, quite diff erent, geographically, culturally and in terms of their caseloads.
110 At the same time as the RAND study was conducted, a smaller study, also funded by the federal government (by the Federal Judicial Center), did fi nd that certain ADR practices in the courts were eff ective in reducing time to trial and total costs for fi nal dispute resolution.
111 Both studies found considerable user satisfaction with diff erent court-based dispute resolution options, even where respondents had no comparison base because they could not take their single dispute to diff erent or controlled treatments for comparison.
112 Thus, the eff ectiveness, effi ciency and effi cacy of ADR in the courts, as compared to an evershrinking number of cases actually tried in courts (what is an appropriate 'baseline' measure of 'normed' dispute resolution?), continues to be vociferously contested and debated among legal practitioners and scholars.
As the courts and formal governments have made more use of informal processes, there has also been a growth and extension of informal processes becoming more 'semi-formal' in the private sector. With the modern growth of ADR in the 1980s, the prime movers were actually large American corporations which, in 1979, founded the Center for Public Resources to promote the uses of mediation, arbitration and other private consensual processes in American business.
113 Commercial arbitration has always been a common way to resolve disputes among and within participants in the same industry, 114 but in the 1980s large corporations, through CPR, signed a 'pledge' to pursue ADR fi rst when disputing with each other (within and across industries). Though not all members were compliant-many corporations continued to use traditional lawsuits-CPR used its bully pulpit and private funds to promote the use of both traditional forms of 'A'DR and help develop new ones-such as the 'mini-trial'. a patent infringement dispute) to privatise their dispute (protecting confi dentiality of evidence, trade secrets, customer lists, experts), choose the decision makers (expert arbitrators or facilitative mediators) and the form of process (negotiation, mediation and witness examination), and control costs and evidence presented. Mini-trials were used in a wide variety of large cases in the 1980s and 1990s, concurrent with continued use of courts in cases where large companies were sued by customers or in class action securities, mass torts, consumer or employment matters. Most recently CPR has developed a new pledge for the twenty-fi rst century, encouraging corporations, in times of economic downturns, to develop more 'systematic approaches' to dispute resolution management, as a good business management principle-encouraging more system design of iterative dispute resolution, more early dispute settlement, and recognition that there are many possible ways to resolve corporate disputes outside of costly litigation, including internal confl ict audits, accountability for dispute costs to functional, not legal units, and other business management devices.
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Thus, private ADR was often combined with public ADR and diff erent processes are selected for use against and with diff erent classes of parties. In general, many courts allowed stays of public litigation while parties pursued various forms of private ADR. CPR, as well as the American Arbitration Association, another private provider of dispute resolution services, also developed formal protocols for industry-wide and specifi c forms of dispute resolution-thus, oil and gas, franchise, construction, health care and hospital, labour management, mass disasters, environmental, pharmaceutical and other industry-specifi c 'model rules and clauses' for dispute resolution were drafted and disseminated. In some industries, the success of these private protocols and 'model rules' provides a fully formalised alternative to the public justice system.
In addition to these private tribunals serving industry, several new providers of dispute resolution services emerged in the 1980s. The Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (now known solely by its acronym JAMS) was founded by a state court judge in California who retired from the bench to found one of the most successful purveyors of private dispute resolution services, now serving all the major commercial centres in the US (and now including offi ces in many world capitals) and beginning to compete with the international tribunals (the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the London Court of International Arbitration, the AAA's Center for International Dispute Resolution, the Hong Kong, Cairo and Stockholm tribunals for international dispute resolution) for arbitration and mediation services. Former judges and private attorneys now earn upwards of $5,000 per day for private dispute resolution services.
In international settings, arbitration may be enforced in national courts where countries have signed on to the UN New York Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958); domestically enforcement is through the Federal Arbitration Act, as if a court judgment has been rendered (with a limited number of grounds for vacatur). In contrast, mediation agreements in the US have no more formal legal force than a contract and must be sued on for enforcement as with any private contract. This is in contrast to some other countries (eg Israel) which now treat mediation agreements, in some settings, as if they were arbitration awards, with relatively easy enforcement in courts.
As commercial arbitration has emerged as an important (but still not the only preferred) form of dispute resolution 116 between and among commercial parties, large companies, in fi elds ranging from telecommunications to health and hospitals, banks, car rentals and computers, etc, have now imposed mandatory 'private' arbitration on consumers and employees, a practice that has been sustained against many legal attacks, by the US Supreme Court. 117 The US is an outlier in permitting this form of private dispute resolution to be mandated in private contracts, without, so far, guaranteed recourse to a public court challenge, except in a few limited instances. Even claims of unconscionability or other coerced contract defences have been rejected in this context. Thus, 'informal' private contractual arbitration (often dictated by the terms of a form contract written by a powerful corporation) has become the 'norm' for many kinds of disputes. Recently a courageous (former lawyer) individual complainant tried to use a small claims court as a way around some of the contractual limits of arbitration and class action litigation. Her victory in the small claims court was reversed on appeal taken by the losing company (Honda). 118 There have been increasing eff orts to attempt to regulate private consumer and employment arbitration (so far through unsuccessful eff orts to pass federal legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act, prohibiting the use of mandatory pre-dispute contractual arbitration in consumer, employment and franchise disputes). A few states (like California) have managed to add a few protections for consumers (confl icts of interest of arbitrators) through civil procedure rules or other state legislation (which is now often invalidated in federal court as pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act). This attempt to 'regulate' consumer arbitration has, however, also led to some eff orts in the private sector to make consumer or employment arbitration subject to some basic 'due process protocols'. 119 In addition to private contracting, both at the industry and individual level, smaller communities have also continued to use informal out of court processes in a variety of contexts. Religious and ethnic groups have long off ered their own courts, mediation and arbitration services for disputes within their own communities. Recently, tensions have been exposed when, as in family law, the formal court must still be the fi nal authority on divorce or spousal or child support, when one party asks for acceptance of the agreement of a religious court, or when one party seeks public court orders to require another party to satisfy legal requirements of the religious court for secular benefi t. 120 The interplay of private religious courts and doctrines for dispute resolution has become a legal issue in a variety of multi-cultural nations, including the US, Canada, 121 the UK and Australia in the common law world and France and other legal regimes in Asia and Europe. Recently, several states in the US (Oklahoma, Arizona and Nebraska) famously used their 'democratic' referenda and legislative processes to ban the use of 'foreign, international or Shar'ia law' in their state courts.
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Many other states (eg Alabama, Texas, South Carolina, Wyoming and South Dakota) are attempting in one form or other to do the same thing. Most of us in the legal academy and many, but not all, of those on the bench (the judiciary) believe these laws are unconstitutional, but they represent a strong sentiment to police the use of communitarian, religious and ethnic enclaves' use of their own formal rules and laws, as well as processes. Religious courts or arbitration or mediation centres in family matters are used by Jews (Bet Din 123 ), Christians 124 and Muslims, 125 and for the most part have had their outcomes confi rmed by courts which apply the regular standards for enforcing arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Local communities have also used informal processes (consensus building, deliberative democracy, public policy mediation 126 ) to resolve land use, environmental, cultural and ethnic confl ict, budget allocation and other disputes, outside of formal processes. With a new cadre of professionals specifi cally trained to engage complex communities in such disputes and group decision making, complex multi-party disputes may be resolved with agreements, often contingent, and monitoring programmes (such as in resource management, land use and zoning, waste siting) which straddle public and private decision making rules and bodies. 127 The legal issue often then involves whether a public body, such as a regional zoning land-use or federal resource agency, must participate and approve agreements reached in private settings, outside of formal court, legislative or administrative hearings. These processes may themselves now be quite 'formal', adhering to community developed rules of engagement, delegation of state, federal or local authority, but such negotiated agreements still often require formal governmental approval, and what was accomplished through these creative informal processes may unravel when returned to more formal and adversary proceedings. 128 Thus, the conundrums, paradoxes and issues in these 'semi-formal' forms of dispute resolution include the relation of the private form of dispute resolution and its 'outputs' or agreements to the state-when and if one party seeks to move dispute resolution from one sector to the other-for appellate review, appeal to public or state values, or to get state enforcement of relief or to reverse what was accomplished in the more informal process.
V. WHAT LITTLE WE KNOW ABOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION USE AND REGULATION
Since the beginning of the modern ADR movement in the US, scholars have called for the ability to empirically study and assess claims made about the relative uses and satisfaction with such processes. Evaluation research (such as in the RAND studies reported above) has sought to look at comparisons between diff erent processes. Social scientists at the Federal Judicial Center have long urged uniform reporting requirements and uniformity of case types and categories on case dockets for comparisons between cases and types of process and for accurate time series to study developments over time. Alas, such uniformity of data reporting does not, for the most part, exist, even within the federal system. Much like the US Census, which has changed its categories of 'nationality' in almost every decennial census, 129 case categories, dispositions and other reported information are ever changing. Below, I report on some of the available data from both court (public) and a few private sources.
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I reviewed a sample of federal and state court ADR systems for whatever data were available on cases actually referred to ADR and whatever data were available on dispositions. The data available are scanty (it appears the Administrative Offi ce of the Courts at the federal level is not keeping track of ADR statistics by court on a regular basis). Courts vary on their requirements to use some form of ADR (based on local rules, local legal cultures and interpretations of the requirements to provide some form of ADR in all federal cases, as now required by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998-which 'required' use of some form of ADR in every federal court, but provided no funding appropriation for this purpose). Examples of the kind of information that has been collected are the rates of mediation success in some courts. For example, the Eastern District of New York (including two counties of New York City and the rest of Long Island) tracks mediation success rates by case type. Successful mediations resulting in settlement vary by case type, ranging (for a sevenyear reporting period from 2003 to 2010) from 38.5% in employment discrimination, 36% in other civil rights, 43% in personal injury matters, 32% in contract disputes and 51% in insurance matters to a much lower rate for intellectual property matters (22% in trademark, 30% in copyright and a low of 13% in patent cases). The Western District of Missouri (another relatively active district in ADR) off ers voluntary facilitative mediation, early neutral evaluation, case evaluation and settlement conferences with most usage of settlement conferences (54%); followed by mediation (34%) and lower rates of utilisation of neutral case evaluation.
Over time, use of (voluntary) mediation has increased somewhat in federal courts off ering such processes; early neutral evaluation practices are used, though only in a few courts, and are the least used in courts that provide a fuller menu of choice (the Northern District of California (federal) and state courts in Michigan were primary innovators in this evaluative form of ADR), and settlement conferences (with judges or magistrate judges) remain the most common form of ADR in the federal courts. A few courts (a federal statute provided legal support for experimental, now permanent, arbitration programmes for fi ve federal districts) require mandatory arbitration of civil cases below a certain value. The arbitrators are volunteer panel lawyers and 'appeals' from those arbitrations are de novo to trial, with a 'penalty' of costs if the appellant does not do better at trial than in the arbitration. These practices have been challenged in the US as violating the constitutional 'right to jury' in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment, but these challenges have failed as long as some ability to go to trial after arbitration is still permitted, even if it is 'taxed' with a bond or penalty payment.
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Off ers of settlement under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules also 'tax' refusals to settle by requiring any party to whom a settlement off er is made and refused to pay legal fees and costs if that party does not do better than the settlement off er at trial.
All federal courts of appeal now off er mediation before argument; all but one circuit now employs paid staff mediators. The District of Columbia (in the nation's capital) still relies on volunteer lawyers. It is diffi cult to compare numbers and practices in particular districts because processes vary so much. Virtually all federal courts rely on unpaid lawyers to conduct ADR sessions, with the exception of mandatory settlement conferences which are conducted either by full Article III (life-time appointed) judges or statutory magistrate judges. Whether such court adjunct personnel should be paid from public funds remains a controversial issue. A few district court rules provide for the parties to pay fees for mediators beyond a certain minimal period of mediation (usually one day or more than fi ve hours). Diff erent courts provide for diff erent forms of training and assessment of such court adjuncts, and there has been concern about addition to or removal from the 'rolls' of this prestigious 'federal' listing, often used for career enhancement.
What should be clear from this simple report is that there is a profound irony in federal ADR-when the 1938 federal rules of procedure were enacted the idea was for some uniformity of federal procedural rules in civil matters; the reality with respect to ADR practice is that it varies enormously by local rule, local legal culture and practice.
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At the state level, most states do provide some statistical summaries of the uses of various forms of ADR, but methods of data collection, categories about which data are collected and outcome measures vary considerably. For example, Florida, which is another state which pioneered use of ADR (and provides rules for training and credentialising of its court mediators), reports extensive data by district (circuit) within the state (documenting great local variations in use of ADR) on case types ordered to ADR (mediation primarily with some arbitration and abandonment of another form 131 See D Golann, 'Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues' (1989) ) and ratios of cases ordered to ADR with ADR actually conducted, ranging by case type and locale from a low of about 33% to close to 100%, evidencing great variations in the acceptance of ADR local 'cultures'. New York reports that, for a seven-year reporting period (2002-09), close to 300,000 cases in the state were submitted to some form of ADR, also with great variations by city and county (eg 80,000 for New York City and less than 100 for Hamilton County, a more rural county). The percentage of cases resolved by some form of ADR in this same period ranged from 45% for the whole state to 41% for New York City and a low of 16% in Saratoga, with highs as much as 60-70% in some counties (including Westchester, a suburban county just north of New York City, which has been an active locale for training mediators). Massachusetts, another state active in promoting ADR reports high settlement rates of cases, without allocating reports to particular ADR processes.
States vary considerably in the rules and regulations promulgated for use of ADR, ranging from mandatory assignments for all cases under a particular monetary amount, particular case types, exceptions for some case types (eg common exclusions for constitutional cases, prisoner's rights, social security cases), to court informal referrals or compelled order to ADR after settlement conferences, voluntary selection or mandated referral in particular matters (eg in medical malpractice, some form of ADR is often required as a condition precedent for bringing a lawsuit). States vary in their practices as to whether they use 'opt-out' rules (all cases under certain values automatically subjected to some form of mediation or ADR, unless the parties have a good reason for opting out) or 'opt-in' systems in which parties choose to use some form of ADR. There is at present a very robust debate in court practice and the academic literature about which is 'better' for the parties (where party choice is the primary value) or the 'system' (higher settlement rates and reduced costs). Many states have subject-specifi c statutes requiring informal dispute resolution mechanisms for particular kinds of disputes, often medical malpractice, certain kinds of consumer disputes (eg 'lemon laws' for defective cars or products 134 ). As a result of the 2008 economic downturn, it was predicted that there would be an increase in use of various form of ADR as parties could less aff ord expensive litigation. In 2012, the state of California announced it would close hundreds of local courts in a multi-million dollar budget cut for governmental expenditures. Although many predicted that this would increase the use of mediation, many local jurisdictions, including my own in Los Angeles, also terminated the local court mediation programme to reduce additional court costs. 135 Although many decried this action, some private mediators I know think this is a good result as there was little quality control of the state-operated 'volunteer' mediator programme. Private mediators hope that, at least in bigger cases, the parties will now choose the more expensive, but allegedly better quality, private mediation services they provide.
in some court-annexed mediation programmes), have attempted regulation of ADR practice through special rules of procedure (California has confl icts of interests rules for arbitrators in its rules of civil procedure), or in lawyer or other professional ethics codes. The status of state regulation of arbitration is now clouded by a US Supreme Court case which held that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts, at the federal level, any eff ort at state interference with or regulation of arbitration.
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Although the use of contractual arbitration has now been federally 'legitimated' by a series of Supreme Court cases sustaining such clauses, how those arbitrations are actually conducted remains essentially private, determined by contractual provisions or by the private rule systems of the leading arbitral tribunals and administering organisations, such as the American Arbitration Association and JAMS. Although some states have attempted to regulate some aspects of arbitration, such as by restricting and limiting its use in some contexts (consumer, employment or other matters), most of those statutes have now been rendered void by the US Supreme court's recent decision in AT&T Mobility v Concepcion (holding that a state ruling that class actions in arbitration were permissible was 'pre-empted' by federal arbitration law). In the mediation area there is very little state legislation, except for those states which have provided for confi dentiality protections and in some cases, evidentiary privileges for mediators (and/or arbitrators) 137 (who cannot be called to testify in later formal legal proceedings).
The US does not, at either the federal or state level, regulate who may be an ADR professional-there are no certifi cation or licensing requirements for mediators, arbitrators or others who attempt to resolve disputes 'informally', though, increasingly, some states, eg Florida, Massachusetts and California, do attempt to regulate training and standards for court-adjunct ADR professionals. Mediators and arbitrators in private settings often are non-lawyer professionals such as engineers and architects in construction disputes, accountants in fi nancial and contractual cases, social works and psychologists in family matters.
Mediation is increasingly used in more and more settings (internal family issues without dissolution, education matters, probate, internal business relationships without lawsuits, organisational dispute resolution) that are far removed from courts and not subject to any reporting or regulatory schemes. Thus, the ability to generate any accurate accounting of just how much mediation or ADR there is is virtually impossible.
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Whatever data and formal rules may be available from the formal and 'semi-formal' arenas, the largest sector of 'ADR' is clearly private (involving voluntary and now contractually mandated mediation, arbitration or choices to use some of the newer hybrids), and the private sector remains fi ercely private. I have served on various study committees which have attempted to gather data on the use, outcomes and other 136 See AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 131 Sup Ct 1740 . 137 See, eg Cal Evidence Code § § 703.5 and 1115-28 (requirements for privilege of mediators and arbitrators not to testify in subsequent litigation and requirements for preserving confi dentiality of mediation proceedings). 138 information on private dispute resolution. Although a few studies have now appeared in some sectors (comparative employment arbitral data from the American Arbitration Association and the US Postal Service, 139 and some data on consumer arbitration), 140 analysing whether employees and consumers fare equitably when disputing with larger companies or 'repeat players' 141 (the results are decidedly mixed), most information from the largest private providers of dispute resolution services remains relatively obscure, with no formal requirements to report information. One ADR provider sought to become publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, which would have required public disclosures, but that eff ort proved unsuccessful. 142 Having had some access to some informal data from one of the largest providers of private arbitration and mediation services in the country (JAMS and another private 'fi rm' providing mediation services) I have seen fi rst hand one aspect of the 'repeat player eff ect'. Large companies with multiple disputes (in California, the major banks, the major supermarkets, Kaiser Permanente Health Care, Toyota car dealerships, etc) tend to use the same providers over and over again. Thus the providers have some incentive to 'please' their repeat player clients with awards that favour them to continue to receive business. Since all kinds of contracts now provide for arbitration or mediation by some of these major private providers, the 'one-shotters' (consumers, tenants, employees) may not even know how often a provider works for a particular company and will therefore be ignorant of possible biases, incentives, etc. (My own home rental agreement some years ago included a form requiring arbitration with JAMS for any dispute arising under the lease. As a dispute resolution professional, I struck the clause from the contract.
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) Thus, to the extent that we know so little about how much arbitration actually occurs and how it is in fact conducted in the private sphere, it is diffi cult to assess how it should and could be regulated. In the last 15 years a wide variety of consumer and employee representative groups have attempted to pass federal legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act, to limit uses of mandatory arbitration in a wide variety of contexts, so far to no avail (with the exception of one statute that prevents mandatory arbitration of dealer-franchisee disputes among car manufacturers and dealers; this special statute does not restrict the use of mandatory arbitration for consumer purchases of automobiles!). ', New York Times, 1996, 1. 144 Congress has provided that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are not valid in two instances. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001 protects car dealers from arbitration imposed by car manufacturers, but interestingly does nothing to prohibit car dealers from requiring their customers to arbitrate future disputes, as has become common. Another piece of legislation protects members of the military from arbitration imposed by payday lenders. It is 'unlawful for any creditor to extend consumer credit to a covered member or a dependent of such member with respect to which . . . the creditor requires the borrower to submit to arbitration or imposes onerous legal notice provisions in the case of a dispute' (10 USC § 987(e)(3) (2000)).
date?
446 Carrie Menkel-Meadow VI. ASSESSING JUSTICE IN PLURAL PROCEDURAL PRACTICES Dispute resolution in the US is now characterised by multiple or parallel tracks, what I and others have called 'process pluralism'. Parties, depending on their economic and legal circumstances, may often choose between formal legal proceedings or less formal forms of dispute resolution. On the other hand, some parties may have no choice at all (such as the 'helpless' consumers and employees who are required to agree to mandatory arbitration processes in their form (adhesion) contracts). In many matters, well-endowed disputants may switch from one form of dispute resolution to anotherstarting with litigation and then shifting to either court-mandated or chosen mediation, negotiation or arbitration, using private or publicly paid-for third-party neutrals. In other cases, parties may choose informal forms of dispute resolution and then seek enforcement of mediation or negotiated agreements or arbitral awards in public courts for enforcement (injunctive relief or execution on assets). The terrain is diverse, uphill, downhill and often rocky for the uninitiated or not so well endowed. Although the 'ADR' movement was originally formed to make access to justice easier and to reduce the reliance on legal or other professionals, the truth is that the landscape of disputing has indeed become more and more complex, with the predictions of outcomes, costs and strategies harder and harder to produce with any degree of accuracy.
The fi eld of dispute resolution and litigation in the US now contains both scholars and practitioners who urge the return to courts and trials for more transparency, equalisation of rules and process and general monitoring of both processes and outcomes, many claiming that a trial rate (in civil matters) of less than 2 per cent of all matters fi led is an inadequate number for a democratic society to produce legal precedents and fair process. For these commentators, informal or even 'semi-formal' process may be considered to be 'empty suits' (no visibility or accountability to those outside of the dispute resolution process), to continue the social dressing metaphor. Or, as another critique, one form of dispute resolution may seem to be 'masquerading' as anotherseeming to have court formality or approval when, in reality, there is little to no (not even 'informal') review of what occurs in the dispute resolution process. Others among us, and I am one of those, still prefer to see process pluralism as off ering the opportunity for party choice, both about process and about the kinds of outcomes that might be possible (trades, new creative solutions, shared commitments to agreements). I have always preferred a full closet from which to select my clothes for a particular event! Yet, I remain haunted or aff ected by Lon Fuller's claims that each process has its own 'integrity' or purpose-one set of values (privacy, on-going relationships, spider web-like intertwined issues in a single problem) for one kind of problem may dictate one kind of process (mediation) that would be inappropriate for another kind of problem (the elimination of injustice in a public institution like education: Brown v Board of Education). Thus, Lon Fuller and others would suggest that we should be clear about both the purposes and uses of each process. Attempts to specify in advance particular processes for particular kinds of disputes have not been particularly successful in the US (some courts prohibit the use of ADR in constitutional cases, prisoner's cases, civil rights matters, pro se (self-representation); others do not), in part because, in the hands of skilled parties, lawyers and third-party neutrals, almost any informal or semi-formal process can be made more fl exible, cheaper, faster and more creative than formal processes, so process choice and eff ectiveness often turns on the particular actors in the process, not on the structure itself. Fuller's attempts to uncover the jurisprudential bases for process choice is now being applied to international or transnational disputing too, where 'the formal' has been even less eff ective, in public, if not private dispute resolution. 145 Yet, it remains unclear whether it is structure and function or personality 146 that determines how fair, just and eff ective a particular process is.
Some years ago, when I was consulting for a major international organization, I was asked to develop a formula for assessing the 'success' of any system of dispute resolution. The exercise was instructive for me because I realised that we need both qualitative and quantitative measures of eff ective dispute resolution, and also that 'measures' of success for a 'system' 147 may be diff erent from measures of 'justice' or 'satisfaction' for disputants or users of any process. I off ered the following set of criteria, variables and factors in the assessment of dispute processes (a combination of 'objective' and 'subjective' measures), while recognising that no single study could ever hope to include measures of them all.
Quantitative or "Objective" Measures
Number of confl icts or disputes in relevant 'universe' (which and how many form into formal claim or complaint) Number of contacts or cases (in a particular process, as compared to the full 'universe' of possible cases or comparable cases in another process) Numbers of issues Number of cases resolved/settled/closed/disposed of ('settlement rates') Number of cases referred to another process Number of cases dropped Case types (categories within systems, eg employment promotion, dismissal, communication, etc) Numbers of parties Types of agreements, resolutions, outcomes Time to process case Cost of processing case-to complainant, to third-party neutral, to programme or system Comparisons (where possible) of all of the above comparable cases in diff erent systems Comparisons of pre-confl ict resolution programme claiming (grievance systems, litigation) or violence with post-programmatic claiming Comparisons of rates of compliance with agreements, judgments or orders Durability/longevity of outcomes Longitudinal comparisons of changes in usage, time for processing, case types, etc Demographic data on users, third-party neutrals, and other facilitators or professionals Variations in usage, outcomes, solutions by demographics, and diff erential characteristics of disputants and third-party neutrals, eg 'experience' ratings Awareness of ability to choose diff erent processes (an attitudinal measure)
Qualitative or Subjective Measures
Criteria for selecting particular processes Client satisfaction Improved relationships (post-confl ict societies (eg Rwanda), families, workplaces, commercial relations) Improved communication Enhanced workplace productivity Learned confl ict resolution/communication/relational skills ('transformative' mutual intersubjective understandings or learned use of new processes, eg lawyers using mediation and other forms of problem solving) 'Better' outcomes (more creative, individually tailored, deeper solutions) Perceived self-determination/autonomy/control over decision making Compliance with national, systemic, family, company, workplace and contractual norms/rules when legitimacy is less questioned Perceptions of fairness, justice and legitimacy of process Trust in institutions, both dispute processing and others Resolution of systemic issues (proactive confl ict resolution, policy changes) 'Value added' to organisation or institution But this list, whether exhaustive or not, cannot quantify, combine or 'equalise' measures of 'justice' with measures of 'effi ciency', and disputants cannot subject themselves either simultaneously or sequentially to formal, semi-formal or informal processes to determine which works best for them in a particular matter. Yet, I worry that, while formal processes produce some modicum of review through formal procedures, court scrutiny, and published decisions and data, and informal processes promise only that the parties can do what they want 'if they agree' (consent based), then 'semi-formal' processes are perhaps the most problematic processes. Informal processes are those we believe the parties have consented to-are they? 'Semi-formal' processes may be monitored ('court annexed' or use of private arbitration tribunal rules of procedure) or made more formal by accessing state power (whether judicial or otherwise) for enforcement, but often, they are not. Court annexed programmes do not necessarily get reviewed by judges or other government offi cials. Private mediation and arbitration agreements and awards are not generally available to parties outside of the processes. Those who choose private processes, even with elaborate internal rule systems, may also have no recourse to subsequent review, especially when agreements are confi dential. (Perhaps this explains why so many of the newer international dispute resolution organisations are now using or proposing appellate processes, eg the World Trade pp? (and in the corresponding footnotes) journal or book? It seems a confused style
